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INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS OF SPEECH 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A 
MOTIVE-BASED RATIONALIZATION 
OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE 
Srikanth Srinivasan* 
When does the application of a law raise a First Amendment 
concern? Though seemingly an elementary question, the answer 
often turns out to be quite ambiguous. If a law's application does 
implicate the First Amendment, courts employ various tests to 
determine whether there is a First Amendment violation. Con-
tent-based regulations usually trigger very exacting scrutiny;1 but 
if the targeted speech falls within certain narrowly-defined cate-
gories, the scrutiny decreases.2 Content-neutral provisions gen-
erally provoke a more intermediate level of review.3 
To trigger any of these tests, however, the law's application 
must as a threshold implicate the First Amendment at all. Un-
derstandably, laws that aim at speech or that in most applications 
affect expressive activities will always raise a First Amendment 
issue. Content-based provisions fit in this category, as do con-
* Law clerk, the Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. J.D., Stanford University, 1995; M.B.A., Stanford University, 1995. 
Thanks to Professor Gerald Gunther and to Brad Joondeph for their comments on previ-
ous drafts. 
1. Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2449 (1994). Content-
based laws are " 'related to the suppression of free expression.' " United States v. Eich-
man, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)). For 
general commentary on the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws, 
see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 189 (1983). 
2. See generally Stone, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 194-96 (cited in note 1). Cate-
gories of speech that receive distinct treatment include commercial speech, libel, obscen-
ity, and child pornography. 
3. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Content-neutrallaws can 
be " 'justified without reference to the content' " of the restricted speech. Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). In actuality, the Supreme Court applies several vari-
eties of scrutiny to content-neutral restrictions, most of which fall somewhere between 
strict and deferential review. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 46, 48-54 (1987). 
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tent-neutral laws that directly target speech (such as laws prohib-
iting leafieting,4 handbill distribution,s or posting of signs6) or 
that inevitably burden expression? (such as laws imposing a spe-
cial tax on paper and ink,s banning honoraria for speeches,9 or 
barring criminals from selling their storiesw). The doctrinal con-
fusion arises with respect to another type of content-neutral pro-
vision: "generally applicable" laws that primarily aim at 
nonexpressive activities,u but that in some applications "inciden-
tally" restrict speech.12 Free speech doctrine is unclear when 
such incidental restrictions raise a First Amendment concern. 
Intuitively, some incidental restraints seem to implicate the 
First Amendment. For example, the use of a noise ordinance to 
halt a political rally may seem to warrant First Amendment re-
view, even though the law applies generally to both noisy 
speeches and noisy jackhammers.13 On the other hand, an in-
crease in general corporate tax rates would impede the publish-
ing activities of a book company, but enforcing the rate change 
against the publisher may seem not to raise any First Amend-
ment issue.14 Although intuition might suggest that the noise law 
but not the tax law should trigger First Amendment scrutiny, free 
speech doctrine is far from clear why (and whether) the laws do 
in fact have different constitutional implications. Specifically, in 
what circumstances do incidental effects like those produced by 
the tax and noise laws implicate the First Amendment? The an-
4. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). "lime, place, or manner" regulations 
generally fit in this category, since they aim directly at speech, albeit without reference to 
its content. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984). 
5. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
6. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vmcent, 466 U.S. 
789 (1984). 
7. Laws that "inevitably burden expression" may not directly penalize speech per 
se, but they have such a predictable and disproportionate effect on expressive activities 
that their application nearly always burdens speech. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 
697, 704-05 (1986). 
8. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 
(1983). 
9. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995). 
10. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 
(1991). 
11. Because they do not target expressive activities, and instead apply to speakers 
and nonspeakers (as well as expressive activities and nonexpressive activities), laws that 
incidentally affect speech are often termed "generally applicable" regulations. See, e.g., 
Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 633, 669 (1991). 
12. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1225 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991) 
(distinguishing content-neutral laws "focusing specifically on expression" from those that 
are "aimed at a wider range of behavior and [have] only an 'incidental' impact on free 
speech"). 
13. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
14. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581. 
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swer is significant, for it determines whether government must 
come forward with justification sufficient to withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny. Yet the Supreme Court has paid the ques-
tion little attention,1s and its cases examining incidental restraints 
seem to point to conflicting conclusions. A closer analysis, how-
ever, reveals an explanation that reconciles these cases, and that 
in general rationalizes the Court's approach to incidental restric-
tions of speech. 
I 
The Supreme Court could of course adopt either of two 
blanket rules, both of which are plausible-that incidental re-
straints should never raise a constitutional concern, or that they 
should always trigger some level of First Amendment scrutiny. 
The Court has embraced the former view in its free exercise ju-
risprudence: Employment Division v. Smith holds that the inci-
dental effect of enforcing a generally applicable law against 
religiously motivated action never concerns the Free Exercise 
Clause.16 Justice Scalia, who wrote the Court's opinion in Smith, 
would also completely except incidental restrictions of speech 
from First Amendment coverage.n Adopting his position would 
signal that the Court's primary concern when dealing with inci-
dental restraints is with legislative motivation: Since generally 
applicable laws by definition target nonexpressive activities, their 
legislative purpose most likely is not related to suppressing 
speech; thus, if legislative motivation is the central consideration, 
their application in a way that incidentally affects expression 
would never implicate the First Amendment.I8 
But the Court has not subscribed to this blanket rule. Some-
times, laws not aimed at speech must nevertheless satisfy a First 
Amendment balancing test if their application incidentally bur-
dens expressive activities. For instance, a law that prohibits 
sleeping in public parks normally does not affect speech; but in 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme 
15. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986), discussed in Part II, contains the 
Court's only serious discussion in this regard, and Arcara is somewhat ambiguous in its 
own right. There is also little legal commentary on the First Amendment implications of 
incidental restraints, which is surprising in light of the voluminous literature on free 
speech issues. Among the few exceptions are Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination 
and the First Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 722-28 (1991); Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
at 105-14 (cited in note 3); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Prob-
lem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 779 (1985). 
16. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
17. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 576-79 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
18. See id. at 578. 
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Court found that such a regulation must satisfy some level of 
First Amendment scrutiny when enforced against demonstrators 
who camp overnight to protest homelessness.l9 And in its fa-
mous decision in United States v. O'Brien the Court made clear 
that "incidental limitations of First Amendment freedoms" at 
least sometimes raise a First Amendment concern,2o and set forth 
a test-essentially a form of intermediate scrutiny-that it would 
apply to incidental restraints.21 O'Brien, Clark, and other cases 
subjecting incidental restrictions to First Amendment scrutiny 
verify that the Court does not regard all generally applicable laws 
outside the scope of First Amendment review,22 and that legisla-
tive motivation is not the only consideration guiding the Court's 
treatment of incidental restraints. 
A different consideration, speech-restrictive effect, would 
justify the opposite blanket rule-that incidental restraints 
should always trigger some level of First Amendment scrutiny. 
The speech restrictive effect of incidental restrictions can be 
quite substantial. In fact, incidental restraints can produce pre-
cisely the same consequences for expressive activities as direct, 
even content-based, restrictions.23 For instance, the general reg-
ulation banning camping in public parks has the same restrictive 
effect on overnight demonstrations as does a law that specifically 
prohibits protesting the plight of the homeless by camping, even 
though in the former case the impact is incidental while in the 
latter it is direct. A similar comparison can be made whenever a 
general law incidentally restricts speech.24 In this light, a focus 
19. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). While the Court in Clark ultimately found that the camping 
regulation satisfied First Amendment scrutiny, the important point here is that it applied 
any scrutiny at all. 
20. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
21. The O'Brien test states that "a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it 
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." ld. at 377. Although 
the O'Brien test was apparently designed to examine incidental restraints, commentators 
have contended that it applies to content-neutral laws in general, see, e.g., John Hart Ely, 
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1975), and the Court seems largely to have 
followed suit. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (finding that the O'Brien test is "little, if any, 
different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions"); Keith 
Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 635 (1987). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (law prohibiting reentry 
on to military base); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (law requiring registration 
with the Selective Service); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (trespass ordinance). 
23. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 105-07 (cited in note 3). 
24. For several such examples, see Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1217 n.12 (cited 
in note 12). By the same logic, content-neutral laws can have the same speech-inhibiting 
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on speech-restrictive effect suggests that incidental restraints 
should always raise a First Amendment concern. Justice Souter, 
joined by three other Justices, seemed to endorse this view in his 
dissent in Cohen v. Cowles Media,25 and Justice Blackmun voiced 
a similar view on behalf of two other Justices in his dissent in 
Arcara v. Cloud Books.z6 
The Court, though, has not adopted this blanket rule either, 
sometimes refusing to apply any First Amendment scrutiny to 
laws whose application incidentally burdens speech. It has, for 
instance, upheld enforcement of labor, antitrust, and nuisance 
provisions against newspapers and bookstores without engaging 
in any balancing analysis whatsoever, despite the restrictive ef-
fect on expressive activities.27 Its reluctance to subject every in-
cidental restraint to First Amendment scrutiny stems from a fear 
that this would require subjecting an enormous range of laws to a 
constitutional balancing analysis. In some sense, in fact, every 
law could incidentally restrict speech in certain applications:zs A 
parking ordinance incidentally restricts speech when applied 
against an illegally-parked newspaper delivery van; the tax code 
burdens speech when used to tax a book publisher. A view that 
would subject all incidental burdens to First Amendment scrutiny 
thus could effectively obligate courts to apply a First Amendment 
analysis to every law. 
impact as content-based laws. Some commentators have questioned the doctrinal distinc-
tion between content-based and content-neutral provisions on precisely this ground, and 
have proposed that all laws-whether content-based or content-neutral-instead be ana-
lyzed under a single "unitary" framework that emphasizes speech-restrictive effect. See 
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 
113 (1981). 
25. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). The facts of Cowles Media are spelled out in Part IV. Jus-
tice Souter, speaking for the four dissenting Justices, suggested that he would engage in a 
balancing analysis whenever a law incidentally burdens First Amendment activities. He 
found " 'nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability,' " because "such 
laws may restrict First Amendment rights just as effectively as those directed specifically 
at speech itself." ld. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). As a result, he would "artic-
ulate, measure, and compare the competing interests involved in any given case to deter-
mine the legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests." Id. 
26. 478 U.S. 697,708-10 (1986) (Biackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that generally 
applicable laws which affect speech should always face First Amendment review). See 
also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 68-69 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
27. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 697 (application of nuisance law to bookstore); Citizen 
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (application of antitrust laws to 
the press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (same); Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (enforcement of labor laws against the press). See generally 
Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669-70. 
28. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free 
Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L. J. 921, 927-31 (1993). 
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In the Court's view, such profound implications for judicial 
review suggest that incidental restraints simply cannot always 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny-the resulting deluge of First 
Amendment claims could overwhelm the courts with constitu-
tional balancing inquiries.z9 "Any other conclusion," Justice 
O'Connor maintains, "would lead to the absurd result that any 
government action that had some conceivable speech-inhibiting 
consequences, such as the arrest of a newscaster for a traffic vio-
lation, would require analysis under the First Amendment. "30 
This concern with "First Amendment overload" is somewhat un-
clear, for the balancing inquiry need not be an involved one in 
every case; the Court could quickly dispense with situations like 
the arrest of a newscaster for speeding by engaging in only a pro 
forma balancing.31 Perhaps the Court's uneasiness with exces-
sive balancing stems from a fear that overuse of First Amend-
ment scrutiny would trivialize the significance of applying First 
Amendment protections. Or perhaps the Court is reluctant to 
subject all generally applicable laws to a "least restrictive means" 
examination (there is no rationality review in First Amendment 
analysis ),32 even the weaker form of that analysis associated with 
the O'Brien standard.33 Or perhaps the Court simply, and rather 
understandably, thinks it inappropriate to include every inciden-
tal effect-even if as remote as that produced by a speeding 
29. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705-06; Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that every restriction of expression 
incidentally produced by a general law regulating conduct pass normal First-Amendment 
scrutiny .... "). 
30. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
31. See id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that incidental restrictions 
should always trigger a First Amendment balancing, but acknowledging "[a]t some point, 
of course, the impact of state regulation on First Amendment rights becomes so attenu-
ated that it is easily outweighed by the state interest"). 
32. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706. Unlike equal protection cases, where the Court can 
use rationality review in less troublesome cases, the lowest standard of review in First 
Amendment cases-O'Brien scrutiny-is akin to intermediate scrutiny: The O'Brien 
standard requires a "substantial" government interest and means "no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of [the government) interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Since the Court lacks a suitable doctrinal tool with which to ex-
amine incidental effects that seemingly should not trigger a searching analysis (such as the 
application of a general tax law to a bookstore, or a speeding law to a newscaster), it may 
prefer applying no scrutiny at all to applying a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Glen 
Theatre, 501 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
33. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (finding that the O'Brien 
standard's narrow tailoring component does not require that there be no less restrictive 
alternative, but only that the "government interest ... would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation"); Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1484-90 (cited in note 21) (comparing 
strong and weak forms of a less restrictive means analysis and discussing O'Brien's em-
bracing of the latter). 
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law-within the reach of the First Amendment.34 But whatever 
the reason, the Court clearly desires some limiting principle, and 
so while incidental restrictions sometimes trigger First Amend-
ment scrutiny, they do not always. 
The Court thus has not adopted an all or nothing philoso-
phy-incidental restraints sometimes implicate the First Amend-
ment and sometimes do not. From a doctrinal perspective, 
identifying the specific circumstances in which they trigger a First 
Amendment analysis is plainly significant: The difference be-
tween applying some scrutiny and no scrutiny whatsoever is, at 
bottom, a doctrinal distinction, that not only determines whether 
the government must at the very least justify the incidental bur-
den under some balancing test, but also in a broader sense delim-
its the scope of the First Amendment. From a practical 
perspective, the distinction may seem less critical, since the 
Supreme Court thus far has applied the O'Brien analysis with 
little bite when examining incidental restrictions.3s Yet the dis-
tinction is not without practical significance. The Court would 
likely engage in a more searching inquiry of incidental effects in 
some circumstances, for instance if the speech occurs in a public 
forum;36 and the presence of a public forum only affects the level 
of scrutiny, not the threshold question whether a law's applica-
tion implicates the First Amendment at all-after all, an individ-
ual arrested for speeding could no more demand a First 
Amendment analysis if on his way to a rally in a public square 
than if en route to a private oration in a residence. Moreover, 
lower courts, if given the doctrinal leeway to engage in a First 
Amendment balancing, might be more inclined (and have more 
opportunities) than the Supreme Court to find incidental restric-
tions unconstitutional, even if the Supreme Court-applying the 
same analysis-would have reached a different conclusion;37 they 
of course would not have that opportunity if the Supreme Court 
made clear that no First Amendment scrutiny should apply in the 
first place. 
34. Cf. Schauer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 787 (cited in note 15) (expressing similar 
concerns with subjecting all incidental restrictions to a First Amendment analysis). 
35. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 110-11 (cited in note 3); Schauer, 26 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. at 787-88 (cited in note 15}. 
36. See Hague v. C/0, 307 U.S. 496,515-16 (1939); Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 113-
14 (cited in note 3); Schauer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 788-89 (cited in note 15). 
37. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (New York Court of Appeals 
finds incidental restriction unconstitutional under O'Brien scrutiny, but the Supreme 
Court reverses, ruling that lower court should not have engaged in any First Amendment 
analysis at all}. 
408 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 
II 
[Vol. 12:401 
But what in fact has been the Court's message in this re-
gard? While we now know that the Court rejects both of the 
blanket rules, and that consequently incidental restrictions some-
times trigger First Amendment review and sometimes do not, 
what are the particular circumstances in which they raise a First 
Amendment concern? In Arcara v. Cloud Books,3s the Court 
undertook its most meaningful examination of this question. 
Arcara involved a nuisance statute authorizing closure for 
one year of any facility used for prostitution.39 Although typi-
cally the nuisance law would not affect expressive activities, in 
Arcara the statute was enforced against an adult bookstore at 
which prostitution and various illicit sexual activities had taken 
place.40 In these particular circumstances, consequently, the clo-
sure order encumbered the store's First Amendment protected 
bookselling activities. In response to this incidental effect, the 
New York Court of Appeals subjected the nuisance provision to 
O'Brien scrutiny, and found the law's application to the book-
store unconstitutional under that standard.41 
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that applying the 
nuisance law to the bookstore did not raise a First Amendment 
concern at all, and that the lower court therefore erred by sub-
jecting the law to a balancing analysis in the first place. Accord-
ing to the Court, general laws that do not target expressive 
activities (and instead aim at "nonspeech"-prostitution in this 
case ),42 only merit a First Amendment inquiry "where it was con-
duct with a significant expressive element that drew the legal 
remedy in the first place, ... or where [the law] has the inevitable 
effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity."43 
Since prostitution, not bookselling, provoked enforcement of the 
nuisance law against the bookstore,44 and since the closure provi-
sion applied to expressive and nonexpressive entities alike,4s 
neither of these circumstances existed in Arcara. 
The Court had never before articulated the rule that a law 
which does not aim at speech only implicates the First Amend-
ment if "conduct with a significant expressive element ... [draws] 
38. ld. 
39. ld. at 699-70. 
40. ld. at 698-99. 
41. Id. at 701-02. 
42. ld. at 706-07 n.3. 
43. ld. at 706-07. 
44. Id. at 706-07 n.3. 
45. Id. at 705. 
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the legal remedy" or if the law "has the inevitable effect of sin-
gling out ... expressive activity."46 The last part of the rule (the 
"inevitable effect" portion) deals primarily with content-neutral 
laws whose impact on speech is fairly direct.47 The first part, 
though, represents the Court's most significant delineation of the 
circumstances in which incidental restrictions merit First Amend-
ment review. Under this aspect of the Arcara rule, the First 
Amendment implications of incidental restraints apparently de-
pend upon the character of the activity that "draws" the law's 
application in any particular case: Only if this enforcement trig-
ger has "a significant expressive element" does the law raise a 
First Amendment concern. 
The rule is somewhat ambiguous. First, it is unclear when 
the behavior that provokes the law's enforcement has a "signifi-
cant enough expressive element" to warrant a First Amendment 
analysis. That is, the rule fails to specify precisely what must be 
the relationship between the enforcement trigger and the sup-
pressed speech. For instance, is it enough that the conduct that 
draws the law's enforcement facilitates speech in some manner? 
Or must the enforcement trigger be necessary to some particular 
expressive act? Or, most narrowly, must the activity that draws 
the law's enforcement itself be expressive? More generally, it is 
somewhat puzzling why the Court only cares about incidental ef-
fects when the activity that draws the law's application has ex-
pressive aspects-the speech-restrictive effect may be far more 
46. Id. at 706·07. 
47. Laws that have the "inevitable effect" of restricting speech impose a "dispropor· 
tionate burden" on expression, so that they effectively "singl(e] out those engaged in ex-
pressive activity." Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704,707. Incidental restraints, on the other hand, 
affect expressive activities only in certain applications, and normally do not affect speech 
at all-their effect on speech is hardly "inevitable." As such, when laws "inevitably" 
affect expressive activities, they are more akin to direct restraints than incidental re-
straints, and it is no surprise that they trigger First Amendment scrutiny. See notes 7-10 
supra and accompanying text. 
For instance, in Arcara the Court identified the special use tax provision it struck 
down in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 
(1983), as an example of a law that "inevitably" affects expressive activities. Arcara, 478 
U.S. at 704, 707. The use tax was imposed on sales of paper and ink, in a manner that it 
effectively only applied to a few large newspapers. When a law's burden falls so dispro-
portionately on First Amendment activities, it seems rather doubtful that the law aims 
primarily at "nonspeech" and only incidentally affects expression. Indeed, in Minneapolis 
Star the Court suggested that the objective of the tax law must have been related to 
suppressing expression. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585. In this light, such a provision's 
effect on speech is not merely incidental, but is rather direct. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. at 108-09 (cited in note 3). For examples of other laws whose application, although 
not directly triggered by speech, nevertheless "inevitably" affects expression, see text ac-
companying notes 8-10 supra. 
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pronounced even when the enforcement trigger is wholly 
nonexpressive. 48 
To address these ambiguities, it is useful to examine the 
cases the Court cited in Arcara as supporting its newly fashioned 
rule. The Court first identified two decisions involving "symbolic 
conduct," the draft card burning case, United States v. O'Brien,49 
and the expressive camping case, Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence.so According to the Court, it applied First 
Amendment scrutiny in O'Brien and Clark because in both cases 
the behavior that drew the law's enforcement had a sufficiently 
"expressive element." O'Brien evaluated the constitutionality of 
a federal law prohibiting destruction of draft certificates. The 
law aimed at conduct, draft card destruction, which often can be 
nonexpressive.s1 But when, as in O'Brien, protesters burn their 
draft cards to display their opposition to the draft, the conduct 
that triggers the law's enforcement becomes expressive. Simi-
larly, although the activity that drew the law's enforcement in 
Clark (sleeping in a park) seldom relates to speech, it becomes 
expressive when, as was the situation in Clark, demonstrators 
camp to protest the plight of the homeless. 
The Court's use of O'Brien and Clark to illustrate the Ar-
cara rule's meaning suggests that the rule should be construed 
narrowly, so that incidental restraints only concern the First 
Amendment when the activity that draws the law's application is 
itself used to express a message. This interpretation conforms the 
treatment of incidental restrictions with general First Amend-
ment doctrine: Expressive activity also triggers the application of 
both content-based laws and content-neutral provisions that di-
48. Compare, for example, the application of the nuisance law to the bookstore in 
Arcara with enforcement of a generally applicable trespass law against a lone protester. 
In the latter situation, the activity that triggers the law's enforcement, demonstrating on 
private property, clearly has expressive elements. Yet enforcement of the law has a rela-
tively minor effect on speech: First, there is only one protester, whose message may not be 
heard by anyone; and second, the individual can continue his protest just outside of the 
property line. In the Arcara situation, in contrast, the restrictive effect on speech (closure 
of a bookstore for one year) is likely more substantial in a quantitative sense. even though 
the sexual activities that triggered enforcement of the nuisance law are nonexpressive. 
49. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
50. 468 u.s. 288 (1984). 
51. Although it seems somewhat dubious that individuals would often destroy their 
draft certificates for nonexpressive reasons, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Mo-
tive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal 
Sacrifice, 1993 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 34 (suggesting that violations of the ban on draft card de-
struction will almost always be expressive, except for "the odd soul who bums a draft card 
just to stay warm or to light up his campsite"), the Court characterizes the law as one that 
aims primarily at nonspeech conduct. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 702 (contending that "the 
destruction of a draft card is not ordinarily expressive conduct"). 
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rectly affect speech.sz The relevant questions thus become: Is the 
activity that draws the law's enforcement itself expressive, or on 
the other hand, is it possible to distinguish a nonexpressive en-
forcement trigger? Both expressive draft card burning and ex-
pressive camping implicate the First Amendment under this test: 
Since it is analytically impossible to distinguish their expressive 
and nonexpressive aspects, one cannot isolate a wholly nonex-
pressive activity that draws the law's application.s3 The enforce-
ment trigger, therefore, is undeniably expressive. 
This interpretation of the Arcara rule not only explains why 
the Court applied First Amendment scrutiny in O'Brien and 
Clark; it also demonstrates why the Court finds no First Amend-
ment issue in other situations. In Arcara itself, for instance, the 
activity that drew the nuisance provision's enforcement (prostitu-
tion) lacked any expressive element,s4 and the restricted speech 
(the bookstore's expressive activities were it not closed) was 
completely distinguishable from the enforcement trigger. Like-
wise, application of a speeding law to a newscaster would not 
raise a First Amendment concern:ss The nonspeech that triggers 
the law's enforcement (speeding) is not itself expressive, and the 
speech that the law incidentally restricts (the story the newscaster 
was rushing to cover) is analytically distinct from the enforce-
ment trigger. For similar reasons, the rule explains why the 
Court finds no First Amendment issue with applying general cor-
52. This is somewhat tautological-it means nothing more than that expressive flag 
burning triggers the enforcement of a content-based ban on burning the flag, see Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and that distributing leaflets provokes the application of a 
content-neutral provision barring leafleting, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
53. See Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1495-96 (cited in note 21) ("(B]urning a draft card 
to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% 
expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communication, and no 
communication that does not result from conduct." Therefore, "to outlaw the act is ... 
necessarily to regulate both elements."). 
54. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705. Prostitution could conceivably be expressive in some 
situations, but the Supreme Court likely considers prostitution to be conduct that, as a 
matter of law, can never be expressive. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 
(1993); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 
U.S. 19, 25 (1989); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
55. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Several commentators 
have also used this as an example of a situation that would not trigger any First Amend-
ment scrutiny. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-23 n.2 (2d ed. 
1988); Schauer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 790 (cited in note 15); Williams, 139 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. at 723 (cited in note 15). 
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porate tax rates to bookstores,s6 or with enforcing labor or anti-
trust laws against newspapers.s1 
This interpretation of the Arcara rule, however, has diffi-
culty explaining another case the Court cited in Arcara for sup-
port, United States v. Albertini.ss Albertini concerned an 
ordinance that prohibits individuals from reentering a military 
base after having been barred by military officials.s9 The defend-
ant, Albertini, had destroyed secret documents at a military in-
stallation.60 In response, the military (pursuant to the anti-
reentry provision) forbade him from entering the base again. Al-
bertini nevertheless reentered the base during an open house 
several years later, where he and some companions peacefully 
protested against nuclear arms proliferation.61 Recognizing Al-
bertini, military officials halted the demonstration and arrested 
him for violating the reentry law.6z Albertini challenged his sub-
sequent conviction on First Amendment grounds. 
Since Albertini did not begin his protest until after he had 
illegally reentered the base, the conduct that drew application of 
the law (the initial reentry) was not itself expressive. The situa-
tion therefore differs from O'Brien and Clark. Moreover, not 
only was the enforcement trigger non-expressive, it was not even 
contemporaneous with the restricted speech (unlike, for exam-
ple, a trespass that occurs during a demonstration).63 Because it 
is possible to identify a nonexpressive enforcement trigger com-
pletely separate from the suppressed speech, application of the 
reentry law seemingly should not implicate the First Amendment 
under the Arcara rule. The Court at one point seemed as though 
it would subscribe to this reasoning, stating: "Respondent was 
prosecuted not for demonstrating at the open house, but for 
reentering the base after he had been ordered not to do so."64 
Ultimately, however, the Court subjected the reentry provision's 
application to O'Brien scrutiny,6s and even though it eventually 
56. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
581 (1983}. 
57. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (anti-
trust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (labor laws). 
58. 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (cited in Arcara, 478 U.S. at 703}. 
59. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677-78. 
60. Id. at 677. 
61. Id. at 678. 
62. Id. at 678-79. 
63. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
64. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 686. 
65. Id. at 687-89. 
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found no First Amendment violation, it at least established that 
the law raised a First Amendment concern. 
Albertini indicates that incidental restraints may trigger a 
First Amendment analysis even if the behavior that draws the 
law's application is not itself expressive.66 There are of course 
more expansive ways to interpret the Arcara rule so that it would 
accommodate Albertini. For instance, the activity that draws the 
law's application may be deemed to have a "significant expres-
sive element" not only when it is itself expressive,67 but also if it 
facilitates some expressive activity, or, more narrowly, if it is nec-
essary to some particular speech act. Since illegally reentering 
the base facilitated Albertini's protest, and was also necessary to 
allow his on-base demonstration, these broader constructions of 
the rule could explain the Court's decision to subject the reentry 
provision to an O'Brien analysis. 
But the Court could not have meant in Arcara to invite First 
Amendment scrutiny whenever the activity that triggers the law's 
application facilitates speech or is necessary to some expressive 
act. Otherwise, enforcing a speeding law against a news reporter 
might require a First Amendment analysis; it is not difficult to 
envision situations in which speeding both facilitates reporting a 
particular story and is necessary to report the story. As a result, 
expanding the Arcara rule to accommodate Albertini would also 
erroneously sweep in the speeding law (and a host of other 
laws).68 This suggests that Albertini must be an exception to the 
Arcara rule, with the rule retaining its narrower interpretation. 
But why is the speeding law also not an exception?-after all, 
both speeding and illegal reentry can facilitate speech. That is, 
why should an arrest for illegally reentering the base to protest 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny, when an arrest for illegally 
speeding to the base to protest would not? And can any justifica-
tion for this distinction be reconciled with the Arcara rule, al-
66. In this light, the Arcara rule does not entail "evaluat[ing] whether the conduct 
[that draws the law's enforcement] is inherently more like expression, for example, draft 
card burning, or inherently more like conduct, for example, prostitution." Jonathan 
David Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing Constitutionality of Hate Crimes Statutes 
after R.A.V., 72 Ore. L. Rev. 157, 171 (1993). This brings to mind the speech-conduct 
distinction, which ultimately is largely indeterminate. See Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1494-
96 (cited in note 21). Rather, Albertini demonstrates that the Court may engage in a First 
Amendment analysis even if the behavior that triggers the law's application-here, enter-
ing a military base-is not inherently expressive at all. 
67. Arcara 11. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986). 
68. Violations of almost any generally applicable law could, in certain circum-
stances, facilitate expressive activities. Cf. Wtlliams, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 723-24 (cited in 
note 15). 
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lowing a general rationalization of the Court's approach to 
incidental restraints? 
III 
One conceivable justification for the differential treatment 
of the speeding law and the reentry law might focus on speech-
restrictive effect. The speeding law might often only delay ex-
pressive activity, while the reentry law might completely fore-
close it.69 For instance, if Albertini had been arrested for 
speeding while on his way to the base, he might well have even-
tually reached the base and still engaged in a demonstration. On 
the other hand, arresting Albertini for illegally reentering the 
base did not merely delay his protest, but stopped it forever. 
Thus, perhaps Arcara means that incidental restraints normally 
require First Amendment review only if expressive activity trig-
gers the law's enforcement, but that situations in which enforce-
ment of the law produces substantial speech-restrictive effect will 
also provoke a First Amendment analysis, even if the activity 
that draws the law's application is nonexpressive.7o This ap-
proach could possibly explain why the Court applied First 
Amendment scrutiny in Albertini but would not in the speeding 
situation. 
The Court, though, should be reluctant to supplement the 
Arcara rule with an inquiry into speech-restrictive effect. Since 
all generally applicable laws can have speech-inhibiting conse-
quences,n this approach could require determining in countless 
cases whether the restrictive impact is sufficiently substantial to 
concern the First Amendment. It should therefore arouse the 
same concerns with excessive judicial review as a view that would 
subject all incidental burdens to First Amendment scrutiny.n 
Moreover, there is a measurement problem associated with cal-
culating the degree of speech-restrictive effect in different situa-
tions. Calibrating such effects along a common metric seems 
unworkable, which makes comparing their extent in different cir-
cumstances largely guesswork. As a result, courts would have 
69. See Schauer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 790 (cited in note 15) (suggesting one 
possible way of limiting the First Amendment implications of incidental effects is to dis-
tinguish between a mere "restriction" of speech and an "absolute prohibition"). 
70. Such an explanation resembles the one offered in Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 
114 (cited in note 3). 
71. See text accompanying note 28 supra. 
72. See Part I supra. The only difference is that this approach requires determining 
initially whether the extent of restrictive effect merits First Amendment review, whereas 
the other would subject all incidental restraints to a balancing inquiry-either way, every 
incidental restriction receives a nontrivial analysis. 
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difficulty differentiating a "substantial" speech-restrictive effect 
from an insubstantial impact, and the calculation could easily be-
come question-begging. 
Nevertheless, even if it were possible to distinguish substan-
tial and insubstantial speech-restrictive effects in a principled 
manner, and to do so in a way that avoids the "First Amendment 
overload" problem, an effects-based explanation cannot ade-
quately account for the Court's different views of the speeding 
and reentry laws. This is because the speeding law could have 
the same speech-inhibiting effect as the reentry provision, but the 
Court still would not subject it to any First Amendment scrutiny. 
For instance, if in Albertini the base's "open-house" lasted for 
only a few hours, arresting Albertini for speeding could com-
pletely foreclose his opportunity to protest at the base, equaling 
the effect of the reentry law. But enforcing the speeding law pre-
sumably still would not provoke a First Amendment analysis: 
Otherwise, whether Albertini could present a satisfactory claim 
would depend on how late he was to the open-house. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court's decisions make clear that the First 
Amendment implications of incidental restraints do not depend 
on the degree of speech-restrictive impact.73 To the extent that 
these effects can be compared at all, they surely were greater in 
Arcara than in Albenini,74 yet of the two cases only Albertini 
raised a First Amendment concern. 
IV 
There is, however, an alternative explanation that better dis-
tinguishes the speeding law from the reentry law, and that in my 
view rationalizes the Supreme Court's entire approach to inci-
dental restrictions of speech. This view concentrates on the dan-
73. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986) (noting "we have not ... 
subjected every ... sanction imposed through legal process to (First Amendment] scrutiny 
simply because each particular remedy will have some effect on the First Amendment 
activities of those subject to sanction"). The Court's recent ruling in Alexander v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) demonstrates its reluctance to focus on speech-restrictive 
effect. In Alexander, the Court would not apply any First Amendment scrutiny to a 
RICO provision that authorized the forfeiture and destruction of entire lines of busi-
nesses, even though this required permanently destroying several speech-related entities 
(such as bookstores and movie houses) and entire inventories of First Amendment pro-
tected items (including books and films). 
74. The closure order in Arcara prevented the bookstore from disseminating all of 
its books for a period of one year. The reentry law in Albertini prevented one protester 
from engaging in a demonstration at the locale of his choice. While it is true that the 
bookstore could have sold its books at another location, see Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705, it is 
equally the case that Albertini could have engaged in his protest elsewhere, presumably 
including just outside the military base. 
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ger of a speech-suppressive administrative motive rather than the 
degree of speech-restrictive effect. Although generally applica-
ble laws promote legislative objectives that presumably are unre-
lated to restricting speech,1s government may nonetheless use 
general laws to suppress expression; in this sense, a speech-re-
strictive administrative motivation can trump a speech-neutral 
legislative motivation.76 A concern with speech-suppressive ad-
ministrative motivation (or at least with circumstances evincing 
the possibility of illicit motive )77 seems largely to explain the 
Court's treatment of incidental restrictions. While not explicit, 
this concern is inferable from the decisions examining incidental 
restraints, and it elucidates why some incidental effects (such as 
those produced by the reentry provision in Albertini) trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny, and others (such as those caused by a 
speeding law) do not. 
A significant characteristic of speeding laws in this regard is 
the substantial unlikelihood that an intent to suppress speech 
motivates their application. This is due to the nature of a typical 
speeding arrest: The arrest normally occurs without any prior 
knowledge of the driver's identity, intentions, or destination. As 
a result, it is rather improbable that the motive in enforcing 
speeding laws in any given case relates to restricting the 
speeder's speech. 78 For instance, if Albertini had been cited for 
speeding while traveling to the military base, it would have been 
extremely unlikely that a desire to restrict his expressive activi-
ties provoked his arrest. Except under peculiar circumstances, 
his plans to go to the base and his intent to engage in a protest 
there would have been unknown to the arresting agent. 
75. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
76. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555-57 (1965). 
77. There is an important distinction between merely perceiving the danger of a 
speech-suppressive administrative motive, which is what I mean to discuss here, and prov-
ing outright that an intent to restrict speech motivated a law's enforcement. With respect 
to the latter, if the government selectively prosecutes speakers for violating a generally 
applicable law or enforces the law as a pretext to suppress speech, the speaker could 
attempt to prove that the selective enforcement violates equal protection principles. See 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707 n.4. That is distinct, 
however, from situations where the circumstances merely suggest an increased threat of a 
speech-suppressive motive. The argument here is simply that incidental restraints raise a 
First Amendment concern where there is a danger of a speech-restrictive motive. For the 
speaker to "meet the heavy burden of proving selective prosecution," Arcara, 478 U.S. at 
712 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), would require not merely establishing the possibility of an 
illicit motive, but proving that such a motive triggered the law's enforcement. 
78. This of course would not be the case if government enforces speeding laws as a 
pretext to restrict speech. Without evidence of selective application, however, the circum-
stances typically surrounding enforcement of speeding regulations do not suggest danger 
of a speech restrictive motive. 
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In contrast, there is some danger that the military applied 
the reentry law against Albertini in order to suppress his speech, 
or at least that the decision to apply the law was a reaction to his 
demonstration. Even before officials recognized Albertini as an 
illegal entrant, they were irritated by his protest and hoped to 
terminate it.79 And although military police did not approach 
Albertini until after identifying him as being barred from the 
base, the base commander had already ordered military police to 
stop Albertini's demonstration before realizing that he was an 
illegal entrant.so In these circumstances, enforcement of the re-
entry provision against Albertini may have been provoked by a 
reaction to his speech-a desire to halt his demonstration or to 
punish it. The possibility of such an illicit, speech-restrictive ad-
ministrative motive might explain why the Supreme Court en-
gaged in a First Amendment analysis in Albertini. 
To see the centrality of motive in the Court's decision to ap-
ply First Amendment scrutiny, suppose that the military enforced 
the reentry law more like a speeding law, carefully examining 
everyone wishing to enter a base to keep out illegal entrants. 
Were this policy in effect, Albertini (and all other illegal en-
trants) would never make it inside. Albertini still might contest 
the application of the hypothetical reentry policy against him on 
First Amendment grounds, claiming that it restricted his planned 
speech inside the base. But it is highly doubtful that the law's 
application would raise any First Amendment concern: Other-
wise, every illegal entrant stopped at the gate could qualify for 
O'Brien by scrutiny simply claiming that the law's application re-
stricted his impending speech.st The most significant distinction 
between these circumstances and those in Albertini, and the most 
plausible explanation for their differential constitutional implica-
tions, relates to the likelihood of an illicit motive. In the hypo-
thetical situation it is substantially less probable that a desire to 
restrict Albertini's speech could provoke application of the law. 
Since he and all other visitors to the base would simply be 
checked before entering as a matter of course (much like passen-
gers passing through a metal detector before boarding a plane), 
the danger of an improper motive would be very remote. 
The motive explanation not only clarifies why the reentry 
and speeding laws receive different First Amendment treatment, 
79. See United States v. Albenini, 472 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1985). 
80. ld. at 690. 
81. Cf. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. at 706 (suggesting prisoners cannot claim 
their confinement infringes their right to speak in the future). 
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but it also allows reconciling Albertini with Arcara. Recall Ar-
cara's rule that for an incidental restriction to trigger a First 
Amendment analysis, the activity that draws the law's enforce-
ment must itself be expressive. This requirement can be under-
stood as a rough proxy for identifying circumstances containing 
danger of a speech-suppressive administrative motivation. Al-
most by definition, when expressive rather than nonexpressive 
activity provokes application of a law, there is an increased likeli-
hood that a reaction to speech motivates the law's enforcement. 
Conversely, when it is at least possible to identify a distinct, 
nonexpressive violation that triggers application of a law, an ob-
jective unrelated to suppressing speech more likely induces the 
law's enforcement.82 In this sense, determining whether speech 
or nonspeech draws a law's application can be thought of as a 
surrogate, allowing an almost instinctive assessment of the dan-
ger of improper administrative motivation. 
Compare, for instance, the enforcement of a speeding law 
against a newscaster with the enforcement of a camping ban 
against expressive campers. The speeding law's application, to 
which the rule would not apply any First Amendment scrutiny, 
contains an insignificant danger of a speech-restrictive motive. It 
is possible to identify a nonexpressive enforcement trigger-
speeding-and there is ordinarily little reason to doubt that 
speeding (and not speech) in fact motivates the law's enforce-
ment, especially since the speech has not yet occurred. This 
should normally be the case when nonexpressive activity draws 
the law's application (unless, as in Albertini, the circumstances 
suggest otherwise). 
With the expressive camping involved in Clark, in contrast, 
it is impossible to identify a wholly nonexpressive activity that 
triggers the law's enforcement; the expressive and nonexpressive 
components precisely coexist. There is then no conceivable op-
portunity to apply the law against its nonspeech element without 
knowledge of its speech element.s3 As a result, it is less certain 
that only a desire to restrict nonspeech motivates the law's appli-
cation, and more probable that the law's enforcement is a reac-
tion to the campers' speech. The absence of a nonexpressive 
82. Cf. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,2784 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (There is a "vital difference between a punishment imposed for a speech offense and 
a punishment imposed for some other crime. Where the government seeks forfeiture of a 
bookstore because of its owner's drug offenses, there is little reason to surmise, absent 
evidence of selective prosecution, that abolishing the bookstore is related to the govern-
ment's disfavor of the publication outlet or its activities."). 
83. See Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1496 (cited in note 21). 
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enforcement trigger at least enhances the possibility that a 
speech-restrictive motivation has played a part in the enforce-
ment decision, explaining the application of First Amendment 
scrutiny to ensure that the substantiality of the governmental in-
terest (and the means chosen to further it) vindicates the speech-
suppressive impact. 
The recent case of Cohen v. Cowles Media84 confirms that a 
concern with speech-restrictive motivation underlies the Arcara 
rule. In Cowles Media, Cohen, an associate of a political candi-
date, gave several newspapers damaging information regarding 
an opposing candidate, on the condition that the papers keep his 
identity confidentiai.ss But because Cohen's affiliation with the 
opposing candidate was itself of public interest, the papers re-
vealed his identity.86 Cohen then sued the newspapers under a 
promissory estoppel theory. The papers argued that enforcing 
promissory estoppel law against them would unduly inhibit truth-
ful reporting of newsworthy items (such as Cohen's identity), and 
that this incidental effect would violate the First Amendment.s7 
The Court disagreed, declaring the incidental effect "constitu-
tionally insignificant" and finding that enforcement of promis-
sory estoppel principles against the press did not even raise a 
First Amendment concern.88 But this seems to violate the Ar-
cara rule (which the Court never cited): The activity that drew 
application of promissory estoppel law-the publication of Co-
hen's identity-was itself expressive.s9 
The Court's stated rationale for not engaging in a balancing 
analysis was that promissory estoppel law applies generally to all 
activities, expressive and nonexpressive.90 But incidental restric-
tions by definition involve generally applicable laws (the camping 
ban applies to both expressive and nonexpressive campers), so 
the fact of general applicability cannot itself explain the lack of a 
First Amendment concern. Rather, since private litigants, not 
the government, decide when to initiate promissory estoppel ac-
84. 501 u.s. 664 (1991). 
85. Id. at 665. 
86. Id. at 666. 
trl. ld. at 671. 
88. ld. at 672. 
89. If a paper violates antitrust laws or labor laws, see Citizen Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 
U.S. 103 (1937) (labor laws), the behavior that draws the law's enforcement might facili-
tate expression, but would not itself be expressive. In Cowles Media, in contrast, publiciz-
ing Cohen's identity-the conduct that drew the law's application-is itself expressive, 
and this is why the Arcara rule would presumably apply here as opposed to the antitrust 
or labor situations. 
90. Cowles Media, SOl U.S. at 670. 
420 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:401 
tions, the unstated underpinning of the Court's decision may well 
be the impossibility of an illicit administrative motive. In this 
light, Cowles Media is the converse of Albertini: In Albertini the 
Court applied First Amendment scrutiny even though nonex-
pressive activity drew the law's enforcement; in Cowles Media 
the Court did not engage in a First Amendment analysis even 
though expressive activity triggered the law's application. The 
reason for deviating from the Arcara rule in both is a concern 
(Albertini) or lack of concern (Cowles Media) with improper 
motivation. 
* * * 
Thus, although seemingly incompatible on their face, Ar-
cara, Albertini, and Cowles Media together suggest that a concern 
with speech-suppressive administrative motivation rationalizes 
the Supreme Court's approach to incidental restrictions. The Ar-
cara rule-a proxy for identifying circumstances that contain a 
threat (or at least possibility) of speech-restrictive motive-rep-
resents the general default. It subjects incidental restraints to a 
First Amendment analysis only if the activity that draws the law's 
application is itself expressive. But even if the enforcement trig-
ger is not expressive, Albertini illustrates that a First Amendment 
concern may nevertheless arise if there exist special reasons to 
suspect a speech-restrictive motive. At the same time, even if 
technically the enforcement trigger is expressive, Cowles Media 
demonstrates that First Amendment scrutiny may nevertheless 
not apply if the danger of a speech-restrictive motive is especially 
trivial. 
More generally, this analysis provides an answer to our ini-
tial question: If a law that neither targets speech nor inevitably 
affects expression is applied in a way that incidentally burdens 
expressive activities, in what circumstances does the incidental 
restriction trigger a First Amendment analysis? The correct re-
sponse is not always, as an emphasis on speech restrictive effect 
might suggest; nor is it never, as a focus on legislative motivation 
might direct.91 Instead, the Supreme Court seems to have chosen 
a fairly coherent and sensible (albeit somewhat unexplicit) mid-
dle path: Incidental restrictions sometimes raise a First Amend-
ment concern, depending on the likelihood of a speech-
suppressive administrative motivation. And the loose set of rules 
that flow from Arcara, Albertini, and Cowles Media represent the 
Court's implementation of this approach. 
91. See Part I supra. 
